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UPON PREPARING TO read Michael Robert’s analysis of the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath in The Long Depression, I was struck by the first sentence on 
the rear cover summary intended to hook a potential reader. The 
summary begins as follows: ‘Setting out from an unapologetically 
Marxist perspective…’, continuing on to describe key aspects of 
the book. This struck me because when a person declares they 
are unapologetic about an action, it often implies that there is 
in fact something to apologise for. The negative declaration cre-
ates an unwritten but present positive affirmation of the denial. 
My first reaction to this claim was that I did not know Marxists 
ought to be apologetic for their Marxism.
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This is a strangely defensive beginning, but one which 
perhaps alerts us to the ongoing, powerful, cultural hegemony 
which capitalist economics has long established over political 
economy. Part of establishing this hegemony has been to strip 
out all politics, resulting in today’s deformed discipline of ortho-
dox economics. Consequently, often the first battle in political 
economy is to actually do political economy rather than simply 
economics. Defensive or not, Roberts fights this battle admirably, 
providing a lucid, empirically supported, and convincing Marxist 
critique of current orthodox economic analysis of the cause of the 
2008 Great Recession. Further, and again contrary to established 
doxa, Roberts argues that no real recovery has been established 
in the leading G7 economies despite massive monetary stimulus, 
such that the Great Recession and subsequent non-recovery is 
more aptly described as a long depression. There is far more than 
semantics at play in arguing for a designation that would mark 
only the third great depression in capitalist history. Rather, what 
is at play is a long-running debate over the fundamental nature 
of the capitalist system and its future development.
As is appropriate to the high stakes of the argument, 
Roberts draws theoretically upon one of the central and most 
controversial pillars of Marxist theory, the law of the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall over time. This law is one instance 
of Marx’s general thesis that capitalism’s genetic structure re-
quires the system to develop in ways that inevitably lead to its 
negation. Other such instances include the generation of social 
solidarity in the workplace resulting from the common cause of 
labour to reduce its exploitation by capital and the regular occur-
rence of a boom/bust business cycle resulting from overproduc-
tion of commodities and over-accumulation of capital. 
The Long Depression, however, is focussed exclusively 
on the tendency for the profit rate to fall, and starts from the 
assumption that the tendency as outlined by Marx is theoreti-
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cally sound. The argument then proceeds to show that the theory 
translates into an accurate description of capitalist history. Rob-
erts does so by providing copious amounts of empirical evidence 
across the first five chapters dealing, in order, with the causes of 
depression, the first long depression in the mid-19th century, the 
Great Depression of the early 20th century, the post-war period 
and neoliberal response, right up to the Great Recession/long 
Depression of 2008. These chapters establish that a falling rate 
of profit is indeed the historical trend, albeit with some signifi-
cant reversals at different periods. This detailed historical sur-
vey is impressive and more than adequately sets up the grounds 
for his Marxist analysis of the contemporary situation. 
In attending to its task, this book has many strengths 
to which we will turn shortly. However, the vitality and force of 
the first half of the book, that carries much promise, ultimately 
tends to fade by the book’s end for reasons also to be elaborated 
below. Thus, taking the subheading of the book’s title, which 
claims to tell the reader: ‘How it happened, why it happened, and 
what happens next’, Roberts succeeds admirably on the first two 
counts, but disappointingly not on the last. let us be clear at the 
outset, however, about the book’s very worthwhile strengths.
In the opening chapter Roberts clearly lays out the flaw 
in capitalism, as identified by Marx, and this underpins his own 
analysis. This flaw is in the first instance indicated to us by cap-
italist history, and by the fact that its many periods of strong 
growth are always followed by recessions of varying depth, 
which, on occasion, are severe enough to be termed depressions. 
Here Roberts refers to the boom/bust cyclical nature of capital-
ist economies over time, first identified and explained accurately 
in terms of capitalism’s internal developmental tendencies by 
Marx. Subsequently Marx’s analysis has been largely ignored or 
explained away by capitalist economics, and for good reason. The 
highly disruptive, both socially and economically, cyclical nature 
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of capitalism is an outcome of a number of endemic contradic-
tions of capitalist development, including the two mentioned 
above pertaining to the overproduction of commodities and the 
overaccumulation of capital. Most important, argues Roberts fol-
lowing Marx, is the rate of profit to fall in response to a rise in the 
organic composition of capital. 
The organic composition of capital refers to the ratio 
of constant capital (machinery, factories, raw materials etc) to 
variable capital (labour power) in any given production pro-
cess. Together, these form the necessary inputs for all commod-
ity production. Since variable capital is the only form of capital 
that adds more value during production than it costs initially, it 
stands to reason that if production was completely automated 
profit would be impossible. This is because constant capital only 
adds the same amount of value to produced goods as it cost as an 
input to begin with.
However, the unavoidable problem for capitalists, as 
Marx identified, is that the whip of competition forces capital-
ists to continually rationalise production, by reducing variable 
capital costs. Competition also forces capitalists to overproduce 
commodities during boom periods and to over-accumulate capi-
tal during recessions when production breaks down. To acknowl-
edge these endemic flaws, for mainstream economics, would be 
to acknowledge that capitalism is, to a large extent, a highly ir-
rational system. This would undermine the ideologically loaded 
assumption that capitalism is both rational and inevitable. Even 
worse than this acknowledgement of the system’s irrationality 
is the fact that the solution to the ailment entails killing the pa-
tient, since to overcome these flaws entirely would necessitate 
the complete eradication of the defining feature of the capitalist 
order, competition. Again, this would be an unpalatable prospect 
for mainstream economics, to say the least.
In focussing on the tendency of the profit rate to fall, 
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Roberts regards the key insight of Marx’s analysis being an iden-
tification of the fact that capitalist crises are due to an internal 
contradiction between competition and the outcome of competi-
tion. To expand, the competition between capitalists to accumu-
late profit is, on the one hand, the source of capitalism’s immense 
productive dynamism. Yet, on the other hand, the result of com-
petition is a rise in the organic composition of capital mentioned 
earlier. The reduction in the labour inputs that is required for 
the production of goods and services (variable capital) reduces 
the amount of profit available for expropriation by the business 
owner. Roberts clarifies as follows:
 
Competition between capitalists induces reductions in the costs 
of production and thereby increases surplus-value for innovative 
capitalists, frequently via labor-saving technical change. In other 
words, capitalists increasingly use non-labor inputs in the course of 
their efforts to reduce costs of production.1
 
The necessity to rationalise production through an increase in 
the use of technology (of constant capital through automation), 
which necessarily decreases the amount of variable capital used 
to buy labour power, ultimately means a higher organic ratio and 
therefore less surplus-value (profit). Returning to the above bio-
logical analogy, profit is the lifeblood of capitalism, so when the 
flow weakens so too does the patient’s vitality. Therefore, Marx’s 
law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, ultimately to zero, 
shows that successful development of capitalist economy simul-
taneously creates the conditions leading to the system’s decline.
For Roberts a key point then follows: the fundamental 
cause of all capitalist crises is profits, and not enough of them.2 
1 Michael Roberts, The Long Depression: How It Happened, Why It Happened and 
What Happens Next, Chicago 2016, p. 15.
2 Ibid., pp. 13-4.
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But this is only half the story, and the following question now begs 
itself: if successful capitalist development leads to a falling rate of 
profit, how long until the profit rate hits zero and the system col-
lapses under the weight of its own negation? Or more pointedly, 
why is capitalism still going strong a century and a half after Marx 
identified this fatal tendency for the rate of profit to fall? 
The answer lies in the word ‘tendency’ and the fact that 
counter-tendencies exist. Marx outlined a number of these which 
Roberts provides.3 These include increasing levels of ‘absolute 
surplus value’ that come about through extensions of the work-
ing day; increasing levels of ‘relative surplus value’ that occur 
through productivity gains; the relative and ongoing cheapening 
of constant capital, as technologies get cheaper to produce and to 
buy; the buying of labour for less than it is worth; and the cheap-
ening of consumer goods and capital goods through technological 
advances and importation from low-wage economies.
Surprisingly, Roberts misses from this list what is ar-
guably the most important recent counter-tendency to have ma-
tured during the 20th century: the increased monopoly power of 
giant corporations. Many industries are characterized today by 
oligopoly, wherein a small number of giant corporations collude 
in various ways to negate competition over pricing. One method 
by which this collusion occurs, and which avoids the breaching 
of anti-trust law, is the euphemistically known practice of ‘price 
leadership’. The term refers to a process whereby the lead cor-
poration in a sector sets the price of a commodity and so-called 
competitors follow suit. It is as a result of this, and of other simi-
larly aimed practices, that corporations across the G7 economies 
have reported record profits in recent years. Roberts does note 
this but fails to adequately explain the phenomenon in terms of 
the tendency towards monopolisation. 
3 Ibid., p. 17.
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Consequently, while the evidence is clear that the over-
all rate of profit has been gradually falling since the 1850s in the 
leading economies,4 this trend does contain periods of reversal, 
and thus far shows no signs of being terminal. One major coun-
ter-tendency is, in fact, an automatic one, that of capitalism’s 
regular economic slumps. During the downturn phase of any par-
ticular business cycle we see a number of effects: the largescale 
devaluation of capital; the liquidation of many capitalist enter-
prises; below-cost capital goods being made available for surviv-
ing enterprises along with increases in the market-share those 
capitals can gain; increased use of technology to produce goods 
(instead of workers, which reduces the organic ratio of capital); 
and increased competition between workers for the remaining 
jobs, resulting in a suppression of wages. Thus, rather than an 
economic crisis threatening capitalism’s reproduction, it in fact 
provides a solution to capital’s own self-imposed limits, as have 
built up during the boom phase. The crisis provides fertile ground 
for another period of growth, as the profit rate recovers for a time.
Consequently, capitalist development is uneven and this 
applies as much to the falling rate of profit, as it does to growth. 
Nevertheless, Roberts is adamant that ‘there is a tendency for 
the rate of profit to fall over a long period of time, and this ten-
dency will overcome any counteracting factors eventually’.5 So, 
capitalism will provide the source for its own demise, or so it 
seems. The point in establishing the legitimacy of this law is to 
assess the weak recovery in the global economy since 2008. 
Having established that the falling rate of profit is in-
deed supported by historical data, Roberts can now do two things 
simultaneously. First, he can provide an accurate causal expla-
nation of the 2008 subprime crisis as resulting from a rise in the 
4 Ibid., p. 21.
5 Ibid., p. 23.
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organic ratio of capital in the lead up to the crisis. This resulted 
in decreasing profit levels that are for Roberts the primary cause 
of every capitalist crisis, while the subprime crisis of 2007/8 was 
simply a trigger of this deeper malaise.6 The normal outcome of 
a falling rate of profit, as noted earlier, is a capitalist crisis dur-
ing which largescale value destruction takes place. However, 
this has been obviated by state-led central planning whereby the 
major central banks in the U.S., the Eurozone, the UK, China, 
and Japan have used a combination of low interest rates and 
extraordinary levels of quantitative easing in order to stabilize 
their respective economies. Put simply, quantitative easing in-
volves central banks printing new money and using it to buy as-
sets such as government and corporate bonds and bank debt. The 
latter is particularly important as it increases banking liquidity 
making money available for lending. The effect is to stabilize the 
economy, but at a level where profits remain low. The low profit 
level in the productive sector of the leading economies has en-
sured a weak recovery.
Second, Roberts accordingly develops a critique of main-
stream economists’ analysis of the Great Recession which ig-
nores falling profits altogether. In doing so, Roberts highlights 
another strength of his book, its detailed knowledge of the main 
three schools of mainstream economics and of their internal divi-
sions: the Neoclassical School; the Keynesians; and the Austrian 
School.7 Each of these schools, all of whom are capitalist in ori-
entation, resolutely manages to avoid the issue that a tendency 
for a falling profit rate is internal to capitalism.8 For the Keynes-
ians, alternatively, capitalist crises result from technical mal-
functions such as liquidity traps, which result from an unwill-
6 Ibid., p. 26.
7 Ibid., p. 73.
8 Ibid., p. 76.
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ingness of investors to invest their capital.9 Keynesians tend to 
emphasize subjective factors such as ‘investor outlook’ that can 
lead to a liquidity trap, rather than objective conditions such as a 
rising organic ratio of capital. Roberts rightly notes that a nega-
tive investment outlook is logically based on objective conditions, 
namely a low or reducing rate of profit. 
The Austrian School sees capitalist crisis also arising 
from factors outside of the economy, particularly government 
or central bank monetarist intervention that upsets the other-
wise efficient ‘free’ money market.10 For the Austrians, the rate 
of interest is a key mechanism that efficiently regulates savings, 
lending, and investments. According to this perspective, when 
central banks artificially increase or depress interest rates they 
destabilise an otherwise self-correcting mechanism. But again, 
as Roberts notes, a self-governing interest rate would ultimate-
ly be governed by the rate of profit, thus the Austrian approach 
is indirectly focussed on profits, even if it refuses to acknowl-
edge this. Each of the schools utilise their distinct approaches 
in providing what Roberts argues is an erroneous analysis of 
the causes behind the initial subprime crisis of 2008 and of the 
subsequent non-recovery. 
Notwithstanding the value of Roberts’ critique of these 
mainstream accounts, he too quickly dismisses the relevance of 
some of the factors that they identify as having an impact upon 
the rate of profit. In particular, the insights developed by the 
Keynesian approach with regard to the boost given to consumer 
demand at certain points in a capitalist cycle, should not be un-
derestimated, a point not lost on Marx. David Harvey’s Limits 
to Capital points out that Marx acknowledged that there is an 
equilibrium point between wages and profit on the one hand and 
9 Ibid., pp. 78-9.
10 Ibid., p. 83.
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output on the other that best facilitates expanded reproduction 
of both income and output over the long-term.11 If it starts from 
below this equilibrium, a rise in wages will expand the market; 
but if wages go above this equilibrium then a profit crisis devel-
ops. The fact that wages are a central site of conflict in capitalist 
social relations means, however, that equilibrium is an impos-
sible state to maintain in the long-term. 
Nonetheless this insight means that during certain peri-
ods in capitalist development, economic expansion can be wage-
led. It also explains why all the leading economies have large 
consumer sectors and why China is currently following this path. 
likewise, planned government spending as proposed by Keynes 
– that boosts effective demand – can, under the right conditions, 
lead to an economic recovery.
These insights, therefore, ought not to be dismissed as 
casually as Roberts does. This is not the only or main weakness 
of the book, however. Chapters 8 to 11, which detail evidence of 
the weak recovery since 2008 in the leading economies (despite 
trillions of dollars of quantitative easing), could easily have been 
compressed into one or perhaps two chapters rather than four, 
leaving space for development of Roberts’ argument for what 
should happen next. On this last point, we come to the weakest 
and most disappointing aspect of an otherwise important argu-
ment. Upon reaching the final chapter, ‘Past Its Use-by-date?’, 
Roberts’ work ultimately seems to suffer from a case of ‘capital-
ist fatalism’. This section of the book provides no real insight or 
discussion of what will or ought to replace a system apparently 
in terminable decline. 
A further issue here is that this final section of the argu-
ment at times appears to undermine Roberts’ conviction that the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall is in fact terminal for capi-
11 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital, Chicago 1982, p. 77.
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talism. Thus, Roberts often lapses from a state of unwavering 
belief that the falling rate of profit is an incurable contemporary 
problem for capitalism, to a suggestion in the final chapter that 
capital has not reached its global limits since there are billions 
of people still economically reproducing themselves outside of a 
capitalist wage-relation.12 This means that major opportunities 
to exploit labour, and to thus increase the rate of profit, still ex-
ist. One is left wondering if the falling rate of profit is really so 
important after all, since it appears that it won’t really become a 
terminal threat any century soon.
 In that case, and contrary to Roberts’ more general posi-
tion, the tendencies which run counter to the falling rate of profit 
can arguably neutralize the trend in the long-run. In support of 
this hypothesis we should consider the possibility that if the bar-
riers to capital are capital itself, the bigger those barriers become 
prior to any given crisis, the bigger grows the potential for a cri-
sis of value destruction. It is in this way that every capitalist 
crisis both threatens the system on an economic level but, in so 
doing, presents new opportunities for economic recovery and po-
litical interventions. This is why Moishe Postone suggests that 
the limit to capital is ‘an asymptotic curve, you get closer and 
closer to an absolute limit but you never reach it’.13
In conclusion, Roberts shows himself to be more of a fa-
talist with regard to the future of capitalism than he may wish 
to admit. Roberts’ lack of imagination in this regard is revealed 
by his posing the question of whether capitalism is now past its 
use-by-date in 2016. The question implies that it has been useful 
up to now. For Marx, in contrast, capitalism was past its sell-by 
date from its inception. Thus, while Marx does acknowledge that 
the productive powers developed under capitalism are great gifts 
12 Roberts, The Long Depression, p. 250.
13 Agon Hamza & Frank Ruda, ‘An Interview with Moishe Postone: that capital has 
a limit does not mean that it will collapse’, Crisis & Critique, 3/3 2016, pp. 501-17.
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for humanity once separated from capitalist social relations, we 
should not confuse such admiration with a belief in teleological 
necessity.
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